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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KEVIN EUGENE KINROSS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
s Case No. 940577-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE IS NOT LIMITED IN ITS 
APPLICATION TO ERRORS NOT ADDRESSED BY T3E TRIAL COURT 
The State, in its Response Brief, asserts that the plain 
error doctrine "allows an appellate court to review obvious 
errors that the trial court did not address" (Br. of Appellee at 
10). In fact, the State argues that, because the trial court 
directly addressed the admissibility issue of T.K.-'s out-of-court 
statement "huru f;?addy pse-pee" and ultimately concluded thc.t the 
statement would be admitted as an "excited utterance", the plain 
error doctrine is inapplicable in this c&3e (br. of Appellee at 
10). 
However, such a proposition is not supported by the case law 
in Utah which does not distinguish between a trial court's errors 
of commission or omission. Indeed, the only limitations on the 
use of plain error as an appellate standard of review in cases 
where appropriate objections have not been raised are: One, an 
error must exist. Two, the error should have been obvious to the 
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trial court. Three, the error must be harmful (e.g., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable liklihood of a more favorable result 
for the appellant, or the appellate court's confidence in the 
verdict is undermined because of the error). State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, , 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100, 102 (Utah 1993). And 
four, the error must not be "invited". See State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 
1205 (Utah App. 1991). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF T.K.'S 
STATEMENT AS AN "EXCITED UTTERANCE" WAS NOT "INVITED" 
The State argues that even if the admission of T.K.'s out-
of-court statement otherwise complies with the requirements for 
plain error, appellate relief is precluded because the error was 
"invited" (Br. of Appellee at 10). The State bases its assertion 
on the fact that Kinross' trial counsel was involved in the 
evidentiary hearing conducted on the matter during rhe morning of 
trial, that he questioned Tamara Kinross, and that he had 
discussions with the judge indicating "that his concerns had been 
satisfied" (Br. of Appellee at 10-11). In support of its 
contention, the State cites the following exchange: 
MR. ELKINS: Your honor, I wouldn't ledge any objections to 
her not being here. My original concern was simply if we 
were considering this an out-of-court statement as it 
relates to child abuse, I think one of the things the Court 
is called upon to determine is the age and maturity of the 
child. Maybe this testimony this morning takes care of 
that. 
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THE COURT: I think it does. I think there's testimony 
relative to what her age is, and I think the Court can have 
its own knowledge of what a two-year old child— 
MR. ELKINS: Certainly your honor 
(Br. of Appellee at 11). 
However, the State takes the conversation between Elkins and 
the trial court out of context. Immediately prior to the cited 
conversation, the County Attorney, Phil Hadfield, had raised the 
question of whether T.K.'s physical presence before the court was 
necessary to the court's determination of admissibility of her 
statement (R. 212). Elkins' comments that "maybe the testimony 
this morning" takes care of his original concern refers back to a 
statement made by Elkins at a February 23, 1990, hearing—a 
hearing conducted four days before the hearing to which the State 
cites * 
At the February 23, 1990, hearing Elkins indicates that he 
is concerned about the T.K.'s ability to make such a statement:, 
and the court's subsequent ability to rule on the admissibility 
of such a statement without first hearing her talk (R. 191). In 
the conversation cited to by the State Klkins was not, however, 
commenting on the actual admissibility of T.K.'s statement, but 
only to the necessity of her presence before such a decision 
could be made. 
On the contrary, Elkins failed entirely to respond to the 
court's admission of T.K.'s statement as an "excited utterance" 
(R. 214-15). Therefore, the State's assertion that the error of 
the admission of T.K.'s statement was invited is incorrect. 
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Moreover, if the trial court's error is considered as 
invited by Elkins on this issue, the invitation was the result of 
ineffectiveness and not intentional behavior. In support of this 
contention, Utah courts have recognized that "if counsel's 
decision in leading the court into error falls below the standard 
of reasonable professional practice, we may find that counsel was 
ineffective" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, , 208 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 100, 109 (citing State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 
(Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1989)). Therefore, if the 
error is deemed "invited" it must be considered as evidence of 
Elkins' ineffectiveness of counsel—an issue which lies at the 
heart of Kinross' appeal. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
ADMITTING T.K.'S STATEMENT AS AN "EXCITED UTTERANCE" 
Kinross asserts that the position he takes in Point I of 
Appellant's brief is correct and should be adopted by this Court. 
POINT IV 
SECTION 76-5-411 FINDINGS HERE NECESSARY IN THIS 
CASE TO CURE THS SRROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
EXCITED UTTERANCE ANALYSIS 
The State misunderstands Kinross' position with respect to 
the necessity of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-411 findings. 
Kinross agrees that § 76-5-411 findings are not required when an 
out-of-court statement of an alleged child abuse victim is 
admissible under an existing hearsay exception. However, where 
there is no applicable hearsay exception—or as in this case, 
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where the admission of the out-of-court statement under an 
existing hearsay exception is in error—Kinross asserts that it 
is plain error for the trial court not to have made such 
findings. 
In this case, the trial court admitted T.K.'s statement as 
an "excited utterance" or alternatively under § 76-5-411 (R. 
214). Because the trial court committed plain error in admitting 
the statement as an excited utterance, Kinross asserts that the 
§ 76-5-411 findings required by law—and set forth in Point II of 
Appellant's brief—were necessary in this case to cure the error 
in the admission of the statement as an excited utterance. 
Absent such findings, or without the proper admission of T.K.'s 
statement under another hearsay exception, the trial court 
committed plain error. 
POINT V 
KINROSS WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Kinross stands on the merits of his "ineffectiveness of 
counsel" arguments presented in the Appellant's brief at Point 
III. However, Kinross brings to this Court's attention the 
State's erroneous analysis of the first-prong of the Strickland 
v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052f 2064 (1984), test. In the 
Appellee's brief the State, in two separate arguments, engages in 
erroneous analysis of Strickland's first prong. 
First, the State asserts that "to satisfy the first prong of 
the Strickland standard in this case, defendant must establish, 
at a minimum, that T.K.'s statement was inadmissible as an 
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'excited utterance'" (Br. of Appellee at 12). Second, the State 
argues, with regards to Elkins' failure to move to suppress 
Kinross' admissions to Senn, that "To show ineffectiveness in 
this matter, defendant must go through two steps. First, he must 
show that a motion to suppress would have been granted. . . " 
(Br. of Appellee at 21). 
Based upon these statements, the State appears to be 
confusing the first-prong of Strickland with its second-prong. 
An establishment that T.K.'s statement was in fact hot*an excited 
utterance, or a showing that a motion to suppress Kinross' 
admissions would have been granted, are findings which are more 
applicable to Strickland's second-prong—which is that a 
reasonable probability exists that "bat for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." A "reasonable probability" has been described 
as "a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the 
outcome,'' See Strickland v. Washington - 104 S.Ct * ^ u 2063; State 
v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App. 1993); and State- v. 
Creatjmi. 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah App. 1989). 
Strickland's first-prong, however, requires only a showing 
that Elkins' representation of Kinross fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465; Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1029-. The 
United States in Strickland elaborated on this prong further: 
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made errors so 
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serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 
104 S.Ct. at 2064. 
Kinross asserts that Elkins' lack of trial preparation— 
including his failure to order the transcript of preliminary 
hearing which was conducted before his appointment to the casef 
his failure to object in any fashion to the admission of T.K.'s 
out-of-court statement, and his failure to challenge the 
constitutionality of Senn's interrogation of Kinross, demonstrate 
that Elkins' representation of Kinross in fact fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Kinross further argues 
that Elkins' deficient performance prejudiced him or that at the 
very least it was sufficiently deficient to undermine this 
Court's confidence in the outcome. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing arguments and the arguments set 
forth in Appellant's brief, this Court should vacate Kinross' 
conviction of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child, a first degree 
felony, and remand the case to the Fourth District Court for new 
proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of September, 1995, 
7 ^ /tnstsrtZZ^/hd/) a A 
Margarej? P. Lindsay 
Attorney for Kinross 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Reply Brief Of Appellant to the 
following: Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General, James H, Beadles, 
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 
84114, this ^N day of September, 1995, 
^ ^ j ^ \Ct£/l/lr^ J J A,( 
8 
